The idea of fully accepting statements when the evidence has rendered them probable enough faces a number of difficulties. We leave the interpretation of probability largely open, but attempt to suggest a contextual ap proach to full belief. We show that the dif ficulties of probabilistic acceptance are not as severe as they are sometimes painted, and that though there are oddities associ ated with probabilistic acceptance they are in some instances less awkward than the dif ficulties associated with other nonmonotonic formalisms. We show that the structure at which we arrive provides a natural home for statistical inference.
1
Introduction.
You and I often jump to conclusions that are not strictly (deductively) entailed by the evidence and background knowledge we have available. In doing so, we are not always acting irrationally. An alter native would be to assign to each proposition the de gree of belief less than unity that is appropriate, in the light of the evidence, but life is too short to calculate these degrees of belief, even if they exist. Many writ ers, therefore, have been led to consider nonmonotonic inference: inference that goes beyond deduction, but suffers the drawback of occasionally leading to false hood from true premises. For present purposes we skip the important debate between "probabilists" and "logicists" and simply observe that many people take the human propensity to jump to conclusions to be a potentially valuable ingredient of artificial cognitive systems. It is this conviction that has driven the de velopment of such non monotonic systems as autoepis-* Research for this work was supported by theN ational Science Foundation, grant IRI-9411267 temic logic [Moore, 1985] , default logic [Reiter, 1980] , theorist [Poole, 1991] , defeasible logic Loui, 100 106], circumscription [McCarthy, 1980] , and many others.
One natural gloss on nonmonotonic or uncertain infer ence is to say that we accept what is probable. It is well known that this can't work. Our main purpose here is to show that this particular bit of folk wisdom -that acceptance on the basis of probability cannot be taken as the foundation of uncertain inference -is mistaken.
Preliminaries
To make this thesis more precise requires getting clearer about what we mean by acceptance, what we mean by probability, and what we can reasonably de mand of a system of uncertain inference.
We can be quite general about probability. We need only require that it be a function whose domain in cludes closed sentences of our language and whose range, whether it be real numbers, intervals of reals, sets of reals, or fuzzy sets of reals, be such that the idea of a real-valued threshold makes sense:P(S) ?: t.
If P(S) is an interval or a set of reals, then P(S) ?: t means that the lower bound of P(S) is greater than t.
In particular, in interpreting probability, we can leave open the question of whether all probabilities are "ulti mately" based on objective statistics (as we believe) or whether some or all probabilities are essentially sub jective in character. (Note that we cannot identify probability with frequency. To do so would require that we take the probability of heads on the next toss to be 0 or 1, since there is only one next toss and it either yield:; heads or it does not; no other frequencies are admissible.)
The idea of acceptance requires somewhat more de tailed consideration. Clearly we intend it to be tenta tive, or nonmonotonic. On the other hand, acceptance must be distinguished from merely having a certain degree of belief. One suggestion [Braithwaite, 1946] [Kyburg, 1988] .
For example, suppose that in the decisions you face in a certain class of circumstances the ratio of costs to ben efits always lies between 1 : 3 and 3 : 1. In this class of circumstances there is no difference between a proba bility of 0. 75 and a probability of 1.0, and no difference between a probability of 0.25 and a probability of 0.0. Even holding the class of circumstances constant, how ever, acceptance is nonmonotonic. Given evidence E, the proposition S may be acceptable relative to the class C of circumstances. We act as if S is true. There are no odds we can encounter in C that would lead us to bet against S. But when E is enlarged by the addition of new information F, to yield total evidence E U F, then S may no longer be accepted, even in C: we will no longer act as if S is true in C; we may find circumstances in C in which we would bet against S, etc.
This view of acceptance fits in reasonably well with the approach of nonmonotonic logic. When you know of Tweety only that she is a bird, you act as if that were true: you put a top on the cage, you don'tin ordinary contexts-bet that Tweety can't fly, etc.
"Ordinary contexts": if some shifty-eyed character si dles up to you and offers to bet two to one that Tweety can't fly, you take that as relevant evidence that there is som ething going on that you don't know about. Sim ilarly, if you don't know that you have a brother, you go ahead and act as if you don't, and you don't en tertain bets about the matter. But it is not hard to imagine circumstances that would lead you to assign a degree of belief to that proposition rather than simply accepting it.
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and to avoid the calculation of expected utility. On the other hand, if our uncertainty is not negligible, our action should be based on expected utility, and the "probabilities" that give rise to the expectation should be based on approximate frequencies of which we are "practically certain." In either case, there is a role for practical certainty in action.
3 Difficulties with Probabilistic
Acceptance.
As natural as high probability is as a ground for tenta tive acceptance, probabilistic acceptance has received a lot of bad press. It has generally been dismissed as a ground of acceptance in the nonmonotonic world (ex cept when "high" is taken to mean arbitrarily close to 1.0 [Adams, 1986; Geffner and Pearl, 1990] .) This has been so for a number of reasons.
3.1
The Lack of Statistics. Recall t hat we left the interpretation of probability quite open -in particular we left open the possibility that not all prr:;babilities need be based on statistical evidence. This means that, if we interpret probabili ties as subjective, we can simply say that whenever, intuitively, th.: agent is entitled to infer S from total evidence T, we are free to claim that the inference is warranted exactly because the agent is entitled to take the conditional probability of S given T to be high.
A number of writers [Pearl, 1992; Adams, 1986; Geffner and Pearl, 1990] have followed this line, but usually with the constraint that to justify acceptance, the conditional probability of S given T must be arbi trarily close to 1.0.
Few who adopt the currency of subjective probability are willing to squander it on acceptance, however. If belief comes in degrees, then perhaps we can explain all our rational decisions and actions in terms of degrees of belief that are Jess than the 1.0 that would charac terize statements whose truth we have accepted. We need merely single out a class of statements to which we can assign probabilities of 1.0 on the basis of "ob servation" and take the correct epistemic attitude to ward any statement to be its conditional probability, where the condition is our total observational knowl edge. There are difficulties with this position (not the least of which is the problematic character of the term "observation") but for present purposes we leave this dispute to one side and assume that we need to make sense of acceptance for statements with probabilities Jess than 1.0.
Generally, however, the force of the argument that many of the conclusions that we want to accept non monotonically cannot be based on probability, depends on the implicit assumption that probabilities are to be based on statistical knowledge. From our point of view, this is a pretty plausible assumption. The objec tion is nevertheless off base, because there are so many sources of statistical knowledge, and there is more than one way in which a probability can be "based on" sta tistical knowledge.
1. We may have gathered the statistics of a large sample and inferred that they are ch aracteristic of a population, of which the instance at hand is a member.
Some other dependable person may have gathered
the data and reported it to us.
Some other dependable person may have inferred,
from data gathered by yet other people, that a certain statistical generalization holds, and that person may have reported the statistical general ization to us.
The statistical generalization may be derived from
other generalizations that in turn we obtain from reliable informants.
Note that in the last case particularly the generaliza tion need not -and maybe cannot -be construed as representing a frequency in our world, much Jess as a direct generalization from an observable frequency in our world. It may represent a propensity in a possible world, or over a collection of possible worlds.
Furthermore, we should take a closer look at the sen tences whose probabilities concern us. They may be of a form that leads quite directly to a statistic, such as the probability of "the next toss of this coin will land heads," where the coin is otherwise unspecified. We could imagine having a large store of data concerning this coin. But the sentences at issue may concern ob jects that are specified more precisely, such as "the next toss of this freshly minted, never-been-tossed, immediately-after-to-be-destroyed coin will land heads on its one and only toss." By its very characterization we cannot have a body of statistical data representing tosses of that coin.
Obviously, there are many ways of tying the next toss of that special coin to the reported and experimental history of coin tosses in general. One way is simply to point out that, epistemically, the toss described is, like the first toss, merely the toss of a coin [Kyburg, 1961] . Another approach would be to infer from the general statistical character of coin tosses, that in a possible world in which this coin were often tossed (as opposed to this world, in which it is tossed but once), it would land heads about half the time, and then use that counterfactual but justified claim to justify the ass ertion that the probability of heads on the unique toss of the specified coin is a half.
In general there are many ways of tying an event to a sequence of events whose stochastic properties are directly or indirectly known. The problem of fixing on a single way is the problem of the reference class [Kyburg, 1983] . We cannot pretend that this problem has been definitively solved, but it is quite clear that until it is, it is premature to claim that there is a lack of statistics relevant to any given sentence.
3.2
Inconsistency.
A more interesting-and also more problematic-is sue concerns consistency. The "lottery paradox" [Ky burg, 1961] shows that however demanding we make the threshold for probabilistic acceptance, inconsis tency threatens. The story runs as follows. Choose any high degree of probability -say 1 -t -as a suf ficiently high degree of probability for acceptance (for the class of contexts with which we are concerned.)
Now imagine a lottery with fl/tl tickets. Put what conditions you will on the lottery to ensure that it is fair, and suppose that it is reasonable for us to accept those conditions. Then the probability that a specified ticket (say ticket #139076) will lose is 1-[P/tl]-1.
But this is at least as large as 1-t, and so we should be entitled to accept, on grounds of high probability, the proposition that ticket #139076 will lose. Exactly the same argument will hold for any other ticket. Com bined with the most obvious fairness constraint, that at least one ticket will win, these f1/ t l statements are inconsistent.
A number of responses to this oddity have been pro posed. Most of them have taken the form of holding to the demand that the set of statements we accept be consistent, and adding conditions to the probabilistic acceptance rule in order to ensure that this demand is satisfied.
Keith Lehrer [Lehrer, 1 975] proposed that we ensure consistency by allowin g the acceptance of a high proba bility sentence S only when its probabili ty is positively higher than that of any alternative. Thus a probability of 1 -E is sufficient for acceptance only if it is higher than the probability of any sentence contrary to S. T his has some odd consequences. Consider a biased lottery, in which each of the N tickets has a slightly different probability of being the winner. Without loss of generality, suppose that the probability of the ith ticket is less than that of the i + 1st. Then we can be sure that the first ticket will lose. Accepting that the first ticket will lose, we can be sure that the second ticket will lose. Accepting that the second ticket will lose, .. . . , we can finally be sure that the every ticket but the N th ticket will lose, and thus that the Nt h ticket will win. We have preserved consistency, but only with a loss of generality (we can no longer deal with the equiprobable case) and at a cost of implau sibility: the probability that the N th ticket will win may be extremely low; yet we may accept it! John Pollock [Pollock, 1990] Isaac Levi [Levi, 1967] adopts principles that assure that both high probability and consistency are assured. But the requirement of consistency is built quite di rectly into his acceptance rules.
One simple possibility is to accept statements whose probabilities are high, so long as they do not introduce inconsistency. This makes the set of statements that are accepted depend on the order in which statements are considered . If we start with ticket #1, then we can accept the claim that it will lose; but if ticket #1 is considered last, then we cannot accept that claim.
Note that in the case of the classical lottery, the set of statements accepted, for a given ordering of the lottery tickets, will constitute a complete description of the outcome of the lottery: of each of the tickets but one, we will accept that the ticket loses; and of the last ticket, in virtue of the fact that we can accept that at least one ticket wins, we will be sure that it wins.
Teng [Teng, 1 996b] provides a treatment that avoids this problem by taking account of the accepted state ments in computing the probability of a given state ment. Thus we accept the statement that ticket i will not win. Then we accept the statement that ticket j will not win only if the probability that ticket j will lose, given that ticket i loses, is over the threshold. There are a number of formalisms [Priest et al., 1989a; Priest, 1989; da Costa, 1974; da Costa et al., 1990; P riest et al., 1989b; Rescher and Brandom, 1979; Schotch and Jennings, 1989] in which to accept a set of inconsistent premises is not a total disaster. Many of these formalisms are focused on more difficult and deeper problems than face us in making sense of prob abilistic acceptance.
4.1
Strong and Weak Inconsistency.
There are two senses that may be given to inconsis tency. In the strong sense, my beliefs, the set of propo sitions that I fully accept, are inconsistent when there is a self-contrad\ctory statement among them: a state ment of the form S 1\ -S. I am guilty of this when I assert in the same breath that it is raining and that it is not raining. As this example shows, it is possible to make sense of such assertions, and some of the writers mentioned attempt to do just this. ("In a sense it is raining, but in another sense it isn't.") For our purposes this strong form of inconsistency can be disregarded. It can (surely ) never be the case that the statement SA -.S is highly probable. ... but this doesn't seem to apply to the interesting and valuable case of measurement : often you can't settle on any particular measurement to reject.
Let us focus on inconsistent bodies of statements in somewhat more detail.
Finer Distinctions.
First let us note that absent strong inconsistency, we face no difficulties in adding to an inconsistent set of statement logical consequences of each particular member of that set. That is, if S is a member of the set of accepted statements, and S entails T, then we are no worse off than we were before if we add T to the set of statements. Furthermore, if the set of state ments is the result of probabilistic acceptance, T is already there:
Theorem 1 If S is the set of statements whose prob ability is greater than 1 -t, T E S, and T f---W, then
WES.
We are thus perfectly free to apply logic to single state ments in S; we won't get anything that is not also justified probabilistically. How about using more than one premise? Suppose our level of acceptance is 1 -t.
Then any statement entailed by k premises will also be entailed by the conjunction of the k premises, and must therefore be as probable as that conjunction . But the probability of the conjunction of k statements whose probabilities ex�Ceed 1 -t is at least 1 -kt:..
Theorem 2
If P(A;) � 1 -t:. for 1 : • It is a corollary of this theorem that it takes II/ E l premises to derive a contradiction (or even a sentence whose probability is 0!) from a set of sentences ac cepted on the basis of high probability 1 -t.
There is thus a close connection between conjunctive closure and deductive closure. We can accept at the level 1 -kc the conjunction of any k sentences we ac cept at the levell-e. We can accept at the level1-h the deductive consequences of any k premises we can accept at the l -e level.
Deductive Closure
We may take advantage of a limited amount of deduc tive closure within sets of statements accepted on the basis of high probability, even though these sets are weakly inconsistent. We may accept the logical con sequences of any single statement that is accepted; by reducing the acceptance level to 1 -ke we may take account of the consequences of k acceptable premises. Of course, while these logical closures are consistent, they are also pretty far fetched: they correspond to improbable stories. The same may be true of the ex tensions of nonmonotonic logic. This doesn't make them totally useless: they represent the way things could be, and that may be worth taking account of. It is not the same, however, as taking something, tenta tively, to be the case, in the sense that you could act on it.
In [Kyburg, 1974] bodies of knowledge were allowed to be inconsistent and deductively closed maximal consis tent subsets of these bodies of knowledge were used as an auxiliary construction for defining randomness and, subsequently, probability. But there was no sugges tion that strands, as these constructions were called, served any other important epistemic purpose. They were not, for example, to be construed as comprising a set of practical certainties.
5
Classical Statistics and Acceptance.
Classical statistical inference takes as its fundamen tal mechanism the rejection of a statistical hypothe sis under certain prespecified conditions. Although in classical statistics probability is emphatically identi fied with frequencies [Neyman, 1950] , or the concep tual counterparts of frequencies [Cramer, 1951] , or set measures in a sample space [Lindgren, 1976] , and al though many statisticians strongly deny that "reject The core of classical statistical testing is this [Fisher, 1956] : Suppose that His a statistical hypothesis, and that F is a set of possible results of observations. Un der suitable circumstances we can find a region R in S such that if the hypothesis is true, then we will falsely reject H only rarely by adopting the rule that we should reject H just in case we make an observa tion faling in R. The general idea is that the test has the long run property that if it is applied it will lead to false rejection with a frequency less than €. There are more complicated situations that can be considered, (choosing between two classes of hypotheses, for exam ple) and more complicated tests that can be analyzed (for example mixed tests in which the rejection of a hypothesis depends not only on the evidence, but also on the outcome of a "chance event") but the essence of the classical view can be captured by a simple test.
When the statistician has found a test with "nice" long run properties, he is done. The next step is a practical one: we draw the sample, obtain an element s of F, and discover that in fact it is in the rejection region R of F. It is at this point that we go beyond what is classically permitted. We are permitted to say we obtained a sample falling into R, and that R has such and such nice properties. We are not permitted to say
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that, relative to this evidence, the probability that H is false is less than €. As Birnbaum [Birnbaum, 1969] has pointed out, it is easy to avoid saying this, but it is very hard not to think it.
There are some cautions, however. There is a gap be tween a long run frequency and epistemic probability.
An event (taking a sample and having it fall in R) can fall into many class es about which we have some fre quentistic knowledge. We must choose the right such class, and our epistemic probability must be deter mined by what we know about that class . There are cases -for example such cases arise in epidemiology -where determining this class can be controversial.
What is involved here is the problem of choosing the right reference class, a knotty and unsolved problem that has only begun to be explored [Kyburg, 1983] .
Furthermore we must take account of the niceties of negation. While the statistician is perfectly correct in pointing out that to fail to reject a hypothesis is not at all the same as to accept the hypothesis, rejecting a hypothesis and accepting its negation may amount
to different things because we may be thinking, for example, of a particular alternative to that hypothesis rather than its bare logical negation.
Leaving to one side these niceties, and speaking as ordinary scientists, we do accept the negations of hy potheses rejected at the .01 level -corresponding to the outcome of tests that will lead to false rejection no more than 1% of the time. [Kyburg, 1994] .) 6
Problems and Questions
We are left with a number of important questions. 4. What is the relation between probabilistic accep tance rules and the decision-theoretic approach.
Are there situations in which they come into con flict?
5. Can we exhibit real (and not merely realistic)
cases in which combining acceptance and proba bility leads to significant savings in computational cost or a serious improvement in performance? It would be interesting to look at cases complicated enough that we can't "see" the answer, but simple enough that we could run comparisons between a system that makes use of tentative acceptance, and a purely probabilistic system, if that is pos sible.
6. Statistical knowledge is clearly central to any form of decision making. This is just the sort of knowl edge that we should be able to incorporate non monotonically into our bodies of knowledge. Thus our nonmonotonic handbook had better include some chapters on statistical inference. This in turn requires our giving statistics a closer exami nation, and an examination of a different charac ter, than has been our wont in AI.
7. There have to be some rules about probability functions. Common sense does NOT endorse ar bitrary probability functions. The relation among statistical inference, evidence, and probability dis tributions is complex and needs investigation.
